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In order for Chrome to be able to trust a root certificate, it must either be included by the underlying operating system or explicitly added by users.If you are a root CA, the following contacts should be used: Google Chrome maintains a hard-coded list in the binary of which root certificates are "EV-Qualified", along with the appropriate OID that must appear on certificates issued from that root to be considered EV certificates.(Note: Diginotar removed the direction to click-thru warnings a couple of days later, and replaced it with a statement that 99.9% of the time the warnings are incorrect, and the certificates can be trusted.They also posted directions on how to download the Diginotar Root certificate and install it manually as a trusted Root certificate.)These actions by Diginotar raised serious questions about 1) their competence to run a Certificate Authority (of any kind, much less a Root CA), and 2) their interest in protecting the Internet as a whole, over their own interests.Our hearts would go out to those who were adversely affected, but it would not alter the effect.Note: the amount of communication required for a mis-issuance is proportional to the possible effect.Chrome has extra checks built in for accessing Google sites, and displayed a warning to the user.The discovery only became public because the user posted his discovery on a public web forum.
In that case, Comodo immediately spotted the mis-issuance, revoked the certificates, notified the affected parties, and made a full and public disclosure of what had happened, albeit a week after the event.
If you are a root CA who issues EV certificates and Google Chrome does not already recognize these certificates as EV certificates, please file a bug in our bug tracker (https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/entry) including the name of your CA, the fingerprint of your EV root, the OID you use to issue EV certs, a link to your Web Trust for CAs - EV audit, and a link to a server hosting a test or real certificate issued from this root.
Google Chrome reserves the right to distrust root certificates present in the operating system's root certificate list.
Further, we intended to block their attempts to restore themselves to a position of trust by creating (or using) alternate CAs.
It is imperative that a user of Google Chrome can be confident that when proper SSL indications are shown in the browser, the user is in fact communicating with the intended site and not an attacker or other man-in-the-middle using a root certificate obtained improperly from a CA.
While the compromise itself cannot be minimized, Comodo mostly acted in a manner consistent with the trust placed in them as a Root CA (earlier disclosure would have been better).